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THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE MEDIA'S
ACCESS TO VOTING POLLS
BLAKE

D. MORANT*

INTRODUCTION

In 2005, the FirstAmendment Law Review of the University
of North Carolina School of Law sponsored a symposium that
focused on the media's coverage of elections.'
The gracious
invitation to participate in this program compelled greater
contemplation of the intersection of the right to disseminate
information relevant to elections and the commensurate
responsibility of the media to exercise that right in a manner that
preserves the electoral process.
* Roy L. Steinheimer, Jr., Professor of Law and Director, Frances Lewis
Law Center, Washington and Lee University School of Law; B.A., J.D.
University of Virginia. I appreciate the generous efforts of some incredible
individuals: Kira Horstmeyer ('07) and Kai-Ting Yang ('07), whose research
assistance proved invaluable; Joseph Dunn ('05), who, as my previous research
assistant, provided invaluable sources for this Article; Mrs. Terry Evans,
whose administrative support was invaluable; Professors Ronald Krotoszynski
and Brian Murchison, whose work in the field continues to inspire; and my
incredible spouse, Paulette J. Morant, whose inspiration and patience, as
always, resulted in the completion of this Article. I also acknowledge the
concerted efforts and encouragement of the First Amendment Law Review. I
owe a special debt of gratitude to Mr. Wyatt Andrews, correspondent for CBS
News, whose assistance allowed me to access CBS News' studios on election
night 2004, to discover Beacon Journal Publishing Co. v. Blackwell, 389 F.3d
683 (6th Cir. 2004), and to continue my study of the media's coverage of
elections.
1. Symposium: The First Amendment and Press Coverage of Elections
in the United States, Apr. 15, 2005.
2. See id.; see also Blake D. Morant, Electoral Integrity: Media,
Democracy, and the Value of Self-Restraint, 55 ALA. L. REV. 1, 5, 44-45, 61
(2003) [hereinafter Morant, Electoral Integrity] (arguing that voluntary
restraint by the media reconciles its free speech rights and its duty to preserve
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The media's critical function within a democratic society
becomes a fundamental consideration in this discussion. While a
variety of theories prevail,3 I posit that the media functions within a
pluralist democracy, one that not only fosters the autonomous
rights of its citizenry, but also encourages mutual respect for the
autonomous rights of others.4 Because the views of diverse
electoral integrity while exercising those rights); Blake D. Morant, The
Endemic Reality of Media Ethics and Self-Restraint, 19 NOTRE DAME J.L.
ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 595, 598 (2005) [hereinafter Morant, Endemic Reality of
Media Ethics] (noting the author's role as ombudsman of the media).
3. Three prominent theories of democracy that discuss the media's
societal role are civic republicanism, deliberative democracy, and complex
democracy. For a better understanding of civic republicanism and the media's
role in that system, see Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71
IOWA L. REV. 1405, 1408-11, 1425 (1986) (espousing the idea of civic
republicanism, which focuses on the participation of all members of society in
democratic processes while de-emphasizing the importance of personal
autonomy, and arguing that occasionally speech needs to be restricted to serve
the greater interest of public discourse), and OWEN M. Fiss, THE IRONY OF
FREE SPEECH 52-78 (1996) (maintaining that media regulation may be
necessary to preserve broadcast medium as a public forum). For an
explanation of deliberative democracy, see CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL
CONSTITUTION (1993) (advancing liberal republicanism, or deliberative
democracy, which requires legislatures to become more activist to protect
personal rights), Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE
L.J. 1539, 1548-49, 1570 (1988) (describing politics as "deliberative," with an
emphasis upon "collective debate," suggesting that all members of a
democracy should have access to the media in order to contribute to public
debate), and Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84
COLUM. L. REV. 1689 (1984) (noting that deliberative democracy eschews
resource distributions based solely on "raw political power"). For an outline
of complex democracy and the media's role in that system, see C. EDWIN
BAKER, MEDIA, MARKETS, AND DEMOCRACY 144 (2002) [hereinafter BAKER,
MEDIA, MARKETS, AND DEMOCRACY] (complex democracy "assumes that a
participatory democracy would and should encompass arenas where both

individuals and groups look for and create common ground.., but where they
also advance their own individual and group values and interests"), and C.
EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 59 (1989)
[hereinafter BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH] (stating

that "respect for individual integrity and autonomy requires the recognition
that a person has the right to use speech to develop herself or to influence or
interact with others in a manner that corresponds to her values").
4. See Morant, Electoral Integrity, supra note 2, at 20-24 (detailing the
theory of pluralist democracy); see also BAKER, MEDIA, MARKETS, AND
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constituencies are valued equally, a pluralist democracy functions
to ensure that participation in the debate on matters of public
importance is full and robust.5 Democratic pluralism has a close
nexus with deliberative democracy, which encourages the
dissemination of diverse viewpoints. 6 The media enjoys expressive
autonomy, disseminates a broad spectrum of information and,
therefore, becomes the primary facilitator of a pluralistic
democracy.
Embedded within this pluralist model of democracy is the
premise that personal interest in such freedoms as speech and press
are related to, if not dependent upon, the collective interest in
societal order.7 Despite the theoretical validity of this premise, its
true relevance lies within its tacit manifestation in judicial opinions
that govern media's exercise of expressive rights. Indeed, case law
comprises the jurisprudence that ultimately determines the extent
to which media impacts the electoral process.
This admittedly modest Article surveys the jurisprudence
that defines the boundaries of media's access to voting polls. At
first glance, the case law discussed in this piece demonstrates the
judiciary's predictable embrace of a normative, negative theory of

DEMOCRACY, supra note 3, at 143-44 (2002) (arguing that complex democracy
encourages personal rights as well as fostering common ground between
groups and individuals).
5. Blake D. Morant, Democracy, Choice and the Importance of Voice in
Contemporary Media, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 953, 959 (2004) [hereinafter
Morant, Contemporary Media].
6. See Gerald B.H. Solomon & Donald R. Wolfensberger, The Decline of
Deliberative Democracy in the House and Proposalsfor Reform, 31 HARV. J.
ON LEGIS. 321, 323 (1994) (describing deliberative democracy as an ideal
representative or republican form of government which allows the free airing
of various opinions and perspectives on governmental policy through the
legislative process, i.e., hearings, debates and amendments).
7. See infra Part II (explaining in greater detail the intersection of
personal autonomy and collective interests in societal structures such as

elections).
8. Many of the cases surveyed in Part I of this Article pertain to access to
polling places sought by a variety of individuals or entities. My analysis,
however, focuses primarily on the affect these opinions have on the media's
access to polling places.
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expression.9 A more probative read of the cases, however, reveals
the judiciary's continuing struggle to balance the expressive rights
of individuals who seek access to polls in order to gather
information, and the compelling interest of the government to
ensure the integrity of the electoral process. The restorative
balance of personal and collective interests reflects the essence of
democratic pluralism, which recognizes the mutuality of competing
interests of various constituencies in society. '°
Part I of this Article presents a chronological overview of
the jurisprudence governing access to voting polls and generally
categorizes these cases as either a pre-vote context, which generally
pertains to access to individuals before they have voted, or a postvote context, which generally relates to access to voters after they
have cast their ballots. These categories serve primarily as general
references with basic commonalities.
The cases in Part I
demonstrate that, in matters in the pre-vote context, courts tend to
defer to governmental restrictions given the compelling interests in
preventing voter fraud and preserving electoral integrity. On the
other hand, courts are less likely to approve restrictions imposed in
the post-vote context because of the attenuated presence of fraud.
Notwithstanding the basic distinctions associated with the
pre-vote and post-vote categories, Part II of this Article discusses
the commonalities of cases discussed in Part I. More specifically,
Part II exposes the tension between personal rights of expression,
under which the right of access to voting polls falls, and the
preservation of electoral integrity, which supports restricted
boundaries adjacent to these polls. Then, Part II employs the
constructs of democratic pluralism to analyze the judiciary's
attempts to resolve the conflict between individualized rights of
expression and electoral integrity.
This Article ultimately
concludes that personal rights of access and true integrity of
elections are interdependent and their seeming conflict becomes an
essential feature of a pluralist democracy.

9. For more detailed explanation of a negative theory of expression, see
infra note 12.
10. See infra Part II.
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The cases surveyed in this Article expose the continuing
tension between the personal right to expressive freedom and
society's interest in the preservation of electoral integrity. This
tension is endemic in a functional democracy that respects
expressive freedom and strives to preserve societal institutions such
as elections. The reconciliation of personal rights and collective
interests constitutes a compulsory dynamic in a pluralist democracy
and ensures the perpetuation of a contemporary and "free" society.
I. A JURISPRUDENTIAL OVERVIEW: THE TENSION
BETWEEN EXPRESSIVE AUTONOMY AND
ELECTORAL INTEGRITY

First Amendment jurisprudence reveals a perennial tension
between personal, expressive autonomy and the government's need
to preserve societal institutions such as elections. The guarantee of
expressive autonomy, which the media enjoys," reinforces the
dominance of personal, expressive rights over collective interests in
the preservation of the electoral process. Freedom of expression
became presumptively sacrosanct, which led to the judicial
adoption of a negative theory of liberty.'2 Consequently, schemes
11. The media, like a corporate entity, has a constitutional right to free
speech, in particular political speech. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank of Boston v.
Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978) (refusing to distinguish a state's interest in
restricting an individual's speech and its interest in restricting corporate
speech); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (treating corporations the same
as individuals with respect to First Amendment political speech rights); N.Y.
Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (holding that the First Amendment can
still apply to paid commercial advertisements). But see Austin v. Mich.
Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990) (maintaining corporations' free
speech rights while limiting corporate speech in the form of campaign
contributions). The legal basis of the media's right to free speech right is
provided in the Constitution of the United States. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
("Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press.").
12. A negative theory of expression focuses on aversion to government
intrusion on expressive rights rather than the value of free speech as the
facilitator of personal autonomy. Morant, Electoral Integrity, supra note 2, at
26. Analysis of a government restriction on free speech begins with the
premise that there is great potential for abuse in allowing government to
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that restrict information concerning governmental functions face
intense judicial scrutiny. The historic case of New York Times Co.
v. United States'3 provides the basic premise that any restriction on
publication of even classified information requires proof of direct
and immediate harm to the government.14 This formidable burden
of proof imposed by the Court becomes a significant obstacle to
most attempts to restrict information concerning governmental
functions, including elections. 5 The "Pentagon Papers" decision
interfere with a person's expressive rights. Id. In contrast to the negative
theory is the positive theory of expression, which focuses on the value of
speech in promoting expressive autonomy. Id. An individual's autonomy
depends on his or her own assessment of responsibility rather than the
sovereign's exercise of power. Id. The judiciary prefers the negative theory in
analyzing free speech cases. It believes that expressive rights, which are
explicitly protected by the First Amendment, take precedence over the
implied collective interest in fair elections. Id. at 29, 32. See SUNSTEIN, THE
PARTIAL CONSTITUTION, supra note 3, at 209 (explaining that the First
Amendment acts as a negative liberty to free individuals from governmental
intrusions of their free speech rights); Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to
Common Use: First Amendment Constraints on Enclosure of the Public
Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354, 438 (1999) (describing negative liberty's
version of the First Amendment suggesting that government refrain from
preventing speech or punishing people for speaking); Morant, Electoral
Integrity, supra note 2 at 30-32 (noting the judiciary's adoption of a negative
theory of expression in deciding Daily Herald Co. v. Munro, 838 F.2d 380 (9th
Cir. 1988); see also CBS Inc. v. Smith, 681 F. Supp. 794 (S.D. Fla. 1988); NBC,
Inc. v. Cleland, 697 F. Supp. 1204 (N.D. Ga. 1988); CBS Inc. v. Growe, 15
MEDIA L. REP. 2275; NBC, Inc. v. Colburg, 699 F. Supp. 241 (D. Mont. 1988);
NBC, Inc. v. Karpan, No. 88-0320-B (D. Wyo. 1988)).
13. 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam). This decision is also known as the
Pentagon Papers case.
14. Id. at 726-27 (Brennan, J., concurring).
The United States
government sought to enjoin newspapers from publishing classified Pentagon
documents related to the ongoing Vietnam War. The Court held that the
government had no right to restrict the newspapers' right to free speech and
refused to enjoin publication, since any form of prior restraint to expression
faced a "heavy presumption" of unconstitutionality. Id. at 714 (per curiam)
(quoting Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963)).
15. See Morant, Electoral Integrity, supra note 2, at 28-30 (noting that,
after the "Pentagon Papers" case, subsequent attempts to restrict media free
expression in the context of elections predominantly failed). In the following
cases, courts denied states' efforts to prevent media exit polling: Beacon
Journal Publ'g Co., Inc. v. Blackwell, 389 F.3d 683 (6th Cir. 2004); Daily
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strongly suggests that speculative or attenuated rationales will not
support prior restraints designed to preserve governmental
functions such as elections.' 6 Even an hour delay in the media's
publication of election results would invoke strict judicial scrutiny
because the "loss of [expressive] freedoms, for even minimal
7
periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.'
The primacy of expressive rights, 8 together with media's
essential role as overseers of democratic functions,'9 contribute to
the dubious legality of restrictions on information gathering and
access to governmental functions. Yet, the doubtful legality of
governmental restrictions is not presumptive, given the critical
nature of elections in a democratic society. Moreover, the possible
impact of media's exercise of their expressive rights on electoral
integrity 0 requires a degree of judicial flexibility that permits
scrutiny in the contexts of various elections. The analysis below
reveals the emergence of a unique jurisprudence that underscores
the tension between the personal right to expressive autonomy and
the collective interests in the maintenance of electoral integrity.

Herald Co., 838 F.2d 380; Cleland, 697 F. Supp. 1204; Colburg, 699 F. Supp.
241; Karpan, No. 88-0320-B; Growe, 15 MEDIA L. REP. 2275; Journal
Broadcasting of Kentucky, Inc. v. Logsdon, No. C 88-0147-L(A), 1988 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 16864 (W.D. Ky 1988); and Smith, 681 F. Supp. 794; see also infra
Part I.B. The exception is Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191 (1992). See infra

notes 38-55 and accompanying text.
16. See Near v. Minnesota ex rel., 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931) (suggesting

urgent military necessity as one of the few compelling interests that justifies a
governmental prior restraint); see also Russell W. Galloway, Basic Free Speech
Analysis, 31 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 883, 930 (1991) (explaining that the

government's interest "must be extremely compelling" to survive judicial
scrutiny of prior restraints); Michael D. Fricklas, Executive Order 12,356: The
First Amendment Rights of Government Grantees, 64 B.U. L. Rev. 447, 509

(1984) (discussing generally the government's need for a compelling interest
to justify imposition of prior restraints).
17. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976).

18. See infra notes 150-59 and accompanying text (explaining the
constitutional dominance of expressive autonomy).
19. See infra note 170 and accompanying text (noting the media's
function as a check on the government in a democratic society).
20. See Morant, Electoral Integrity, supra note 2, at 10-11 (discussing the
alleged impact of the media on elections and voting behavior).
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Case law governing restrictions on media's access to polls
falls loosely within two basic categories: pre-vote or post-vote
contexts. The pre-vote context generally includes government
tactics designed to thwart voter intimidation and fraud before votes
are cast. These tactics specifically attempt to prevent contact by
non-voting parties 2' with voters as they approach the polls.2 The
post-vote context encompasses cases in which the government
attempts to preserve electoral integrity by imposing limitations on
non-voting parties' access to voters at polls. In contrast to pre-vote
cases, however, post-vote cases include statutory schemes that
strike more broadly to restrict non-voting parties' access to voters
possibly before, but primarily after, they cast their ballots.23 As the
discussion below suggests, the breadth of governmental restrictions
and the nexus of these restrictions with the prevention of voter
fraud and intimidation ultimately determine the constitutionality of
efforts designed to preserve electoral integrity.
A. Cases Within the Pre-Vote Context
The sacrosanct nature of expressive autonomy presupposes
that restrictions on the media's access to polls face formidable
24
judicial scrutiny. Consequently, courts have traditionally favored
personal, expressive rights over the more attenuated impact of the
exercise of those rights on electoral integrity.
Emblematic of this tendency was the 1985 case of Clean-up
'84 v. Heinrich,2 in which the court reviewed the constitutionality of
a Florida statute that prohibited the solicitation of votes, opinions,
or petition signatures within 100 yards of a polling place on election

21. In this essay, "non-voting parties" refers to individuals who seek
access to polls for any purpose other than to cast a ballot. "Non-voting
parties" do not include government-sanctioned poll workers.
22. For a discussion of cases that fall within the pre-vote context, see
infra Part I.A.
23. For a discussion of cases that fall within the post-vote context, see
infra Part I.B.
24. See infra notes 151-55 and accompanying text (discussing freedom of
speech as a right guaranteed under the Constitution).
25. 759 F.2d 1511 (11th Cir. Fla. 1985).
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day.26 Noting the primacy of expressive autonomy, the court found
that the solicitation of personal information at the polls constituted
protected speech. Furthermore, the gathering at polls to solicit this
information was an association protected by the First
Amendment.27 The Florida statute was, therefore, overbroad
because it potentially encroached on the expressive rights of those
28
who were not parties in the lawsuit.
Three years later, the court in Florida Committee for
Liability Reform v. McMillan29 issued a finding similar to that in
Clean-up '84. McMillan focused on a Florida statute that prohibited
the solicitation of voters within 150 feet of a polling place.0 The
government emphasized the public's interest in order at the polls
The court found that the
and integrity of the voting process.
government's generalized interest in electoral integrity was
insufficiently compelling to permit an overbroad restriction of
expressive activity adjacent to polling places.32 In fact, the court
seemingly minimized the impact of voter solicitation, stating that
voters who are approached at the polls are merely exposed to
"grassroots democratic process [that could] be avoided readily by
communicating a declination of interest ....
In 1989, the court in Firestone v. News-Press Publishing
Co.,4 found that the part of a Florida statute that banned nonvoters from a fifty foot area adjacent to a polling place was
overbroad.35 The government's concern for potential disturbance at
26. Id. at 1513.

27. Id.
28. Id. at 1513-14.
29. 682 F. Supp. 1536 (M.D. Fla. 1988).

30. Id. at 1538.
31. Id. at 1541.
32. Id. at 1541-42. To support its conclusion that the statute was
overbroad, the court focused on such features as the prohibition of virtually all
forms of expression within 150 feet of a polling place, its creation of a zone
that encompasses both traditional public fora and private property, the
existence of other statutes that protect voters from harassment, the availability
of less restrictive alternatives, and a previous less restrictive version of the
statute that protected electoral integrity. Id.
33. Id. at 1542.
34. 538 So. 2d 457 (Fla. 1989).
35. Id. at 459.
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the polls was insufficient to overcome the statute's chilling effect on
expressive rights. 36 Moreover, the fifty foot boundary intruded on
speech activity within traditional public fora, which have garnered
extraordinary First Amendment protection as a venue for free
expression.37
Despite the tendency to strike down restrictions on access
to voting polls, cases in the pre-vote context have demonstrated
limited judicial tolerance for minimalist restrictions designed to
prevent voter fraud and intimidation. The Supreme Court of the
United States in the case of Burson v. Freeman38 signaled a degree
of tolerance for minimalist restrictions in the pre-vote context. In
Burson, a Tennessee statute limited campaign activity within 100
feet of any polling place entrance.39 Opponents argued that the
statute violated a candidate's First Amendment right to
communicate with voters.40 The Tennessee Supreme Court found
that the statute was a content-based restriction on speech and failed
to meet the rudiments of strict scrutiny, which requires that the
state prove that its restriction directly addressed a compelling
41
interest.
Contrary to the Tennessee Supreme Court's finding, Justice
Blackmun, writing for the plurality, opined that the facially contentbased statute met the rigors of strict scrutiny.42 The government's
compelling interest to remedy Tennessee's history of voter
intimidation and fraud outside polls legitimized the imposed
restraint, which directly addressed the issue of election integrity.43
The Court observed that "the link between ballot secrecy and some
restricted zone surrounding the voting area is not merely timing -it
is common sense. The only way to preserve the secrecy of the

36. Id.
37. Id. But see infra notes 48 and accompanying text (dismissing physical
boundary dimensions as a factor in determining whether or not the statute
passes strict scrutiny).
38. 504 U.S. 191 (1992).
39. Id. at 193-94.
40. Id. at 194.
41. Id. at 195.
42. Id. at 206-11.
43. Id. at 207-08.
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ballot is to limit access to the area around the voter."" Blackmun
attributed this unusual finding of a content-based regulation's
constitutionality to the law's preservation of electoral integrity.
Noting that the electoral process remains an essential event in a
democratic society, Justice Kennedy, concurring in Blackmun's
sentiments, stated, "[v]oting is one of the most fundamental and
cherished liberties in our democratic system of government. The
State is not using this justification to suppress legitimate
expression." 6
Whether the Tennessee statute was narrowly tailored to
address voter intimidation and fraud was an issue that spawned
problematic analysis. The plurality rejected the notion that a
reduction in the restricted boundary to twenty-five feet would serve
the state's compelling interest. This finding underscored the view
that the statute was overbroad. 4' The Court summarily dismissed
the relationship between boundary dimensions and the statute's
furtherance of the State's compelling interest."8
In my view, Scalia's concurrence, which was the fifth and
deciding vote, left the decision in Burson on tenuous legal footing.
Scalia found that areas adjacent to polling places were not
traditional public fora.49 As a result, the legislative restrictions in
question comported with the more relaxed review standard
reserved for reasonable, viewpoint-neutral regulation. °
While the Burson plurality sustained limited restrictions on
polling access in the pre-vote context, the Court's holding in the
case remains on somewhat precarious grounds. Justice Stevens's
vigorous dissent criticized the plurality which, in his view, "blithely
44. Id.
45. Id. at 206-11.
46. Id. at 214 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
47. Id. at 210.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 214-16 (Scalia, J., concurring). But see Daily Herald Co. v.
Munro, 838 F.2d 380, 384-85 (9th Cir. 1988) (finding that voting polls
constitute public fora).
50. Burson, 504 U.S. at 214-15 (Scalia J., concurring). For a more
detailed analysis of Scalia's argument, that the areas adjacent to voting polls
do not constitute public fora, see Morant, Electoral Integrity, supra note 2, at
33-39.
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dispensed with the need for factual findings" of alleged voter
intimidation and fraud.5' Stevens noted that the Florida Supreme
Court and other lower federal courts had invalidated other state
restrictions similar to those imposed in Tennessee." Like the
officials in Tennessee, those who sought poll restrictions in other
states failed to produce evidence of voter intimidation and,
therefore, failed to justify restricted access to voting polls. 5 3 Justice

Stevens found that the government must prove the existence of
palpable harm that the proposed solution directly remedies. This
harm to electoral integrity must be real, and the remedy must be
narrowly tailored to address that harm. Stevens's admonition
became a significant hurdle for governments that sought to restrict
access to polls on the generalized premise of electoral integrity.55
Notwithstanding its somewhat questionable reasoning,
Burson remains viable precedent. In fact, other cases invoke
Burson's reasoning when the government proves that minimal
restrictions in the pre-vote context are related to the preservation
of electoral integrity.
The Fifth Circuit in Schirmer v. Edwards,56 substantiated the
constitutionality of a Louisiana statute that prohibited the
solicitation of signatures within 600 feet of poll entrances.57 The
court analogized the Louisiana statute to the Tennessee statute in
Burson, and found that Louisiana had a compelling interest in the
protection of citizens' voting rights. 58 The 600-foot boundary did
not, in the court's view, "significantly impinge" on the First
Amendment rights to access. 9 The court emphasized the Burson
finding that the distance of the boundary line prescribed by the
statute, while not dispositive of constitutionality, relates primarily

51. Id. at 222. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
52. Id. at 222-23.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 217.
55. Id.
56. 2 F.3d 117 (5th Cir. 1993).
57. Id. at 124. In Schirmer, the challenged statute applied to attempting
to obtain signatures for a recall petition. Id.
58. Id. at 121.
59. Id.
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to the degree of intrusion on access to polls. 60 The Schirmer opinion
stated that the Louisiana statute was narrowly tailored because the
boundary was increased to 600 feet only after the previous
61
boundary of 300 feet was ineffective.
In the more recent case of Marlin v. D.C. Board of Elections
and Ethics,62 the D.C. Circuit reviewed a Washington, D.C. Board
of Elections provision that prohibited activity that may interfere
with orderly conduct of elections, and takes place within a
reasonable
distance of the polls. 6 3 Echoing Justice Scalia's view in
64
Burson, the Marlin decision stated that polling places do not65
fora.
constitute either traditional or government-designated public
Relying substantially on Burson, the court opined that the D.C.
Board of Election's provision satisfied the reasonableness test66that
should apply to the regulation of speech in a non-public forum.
Unlike Marlin, more recent cases narrowly construed
Burson's holding and required a more demonstrative showing of
the nexus between the government's restrictions and the
preservation of voter integrity. The case of Anderson v. Spear67
involved a statute that prohibited the distribution of instructive
literature within 500 feet of polling places.64 To determine the
constitutionality of this statute, the court recognized that Burson
placed a "modified" burden on the government to prove that its
restriction is both reasonable and does not significantly impinge on
personal, expressive rights.69 The application of this modified

60. Id. at 121-22.
61. Id. at 122. Note that the Schirmer court explicitly rejected the
applicability of post-vote context cases such as Daily Herald Co. v. Munro, 838
F.2d 380 (9th Cir. 1988), which, in the court's view, involved different
compelling interests.
62. 236 F.3d 716 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
63. Id. at 718. The Board of Elections provision included any activity
intended to persuade an individual to vote for or against a particular
candidate. Id.
64. See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
65. Marlin, 236 F.3d at 719.

66.
67.
68.
69.

Id. at 719-20.
356 F.3d 651 (6th Cir. 2004).
Id. at 654.
Id. at 656.
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burden of proof led the court to conclude that the statute in
question was not reasonable in light of the totality of circumstances.
The Anderson court disputed the reasonableness of the
government's ban on all electioneering speech within the restricted
area.7 The court cited testimony suggesting that stricter penalties,
in lieu of broad restrictions on access, would have addressed the
government's interests more effectively.7 1 Moreover, while Burson
did not provide a bright-line rule regarding the distance, the
Anderson court also noted Burson's admonition that certain
restrictions on access to polls could constitute
S• 72impermissible
burdens on First Amendment expressive activity.
The court,
accordingly, found that the state's 500-foot boundary, which was
exponentially greater than the restriction in Burson, significantly
impinged on expressive rights. 3
United Food & Commercial Workers Local 1099 v. City of
Sidney74 also strictly construed Burson in the pre-vote context. In
this case, the government prohibited individuals from seeking
signatures for a referendum in areas adjacent to polling places on
election day. 5 The petitioners contended that their activity took
place on access
ways that were outside of the 100-foot campaign76
free zones. While the court acknowledged Burson's finding that
boundaries and campaign-free zones pass constitutional muster, the
areas beyond these zones constituted traditional
public fora in
S 77
which restricted access garners greater scrutiny.
The court in
United Food then remanded the case for a factual determination of
whether the petitioners' expressive rights were chilled by alleged
threats of arrest, and whether those threats were reasonable under
the circumstances. 78

70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Id. at 659.
Id.
Id. at 657.
Id. at 663.
364 F.3d 738 (6th Cir. 2004).
Id. at 741.
Id. at 742.
Id. at 746-47.
Id. at 752-53.
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Other cases have confined Burson's holding to expressive
activity conducted in public areas.
Consequently, while
government may restrict access in the pre-vote context within a
reasonable distance of polling places, those restrictions may not
impermissibly burden expressive activity that takes place on private
property. 79 Governmental restrictions that explicitly limit campaign
activity on private property fall outside the scope of Burson and
are, therefore, unconstitutional. 8°
B. Cases Within the Post-Vote Context
The dominance of expressive autonomy in First
Amendment jurisprudence becomes particularly evident in cases
involving the restriction of expressive activity that occurs in the
post-vote context.
Of particular note, exit polling by media
81
constitutes the primary expressive activity in the post-vote context .
Because post-vote activity often involves contact with individuals
after they have voted, restrictions in this context have a more
attenuated nexus with the government's interest in electoral
integrity. As a result, courts view governmental attempts to limit
post-vote activities with notable antipathy.
The most significant post-vote case that reviewed
restrictions on exit polling is Daily Herald Co. v. Munro.2 In Daily
Herald Co., the court reviewed a Washington state statute
prohibiting anyone from conducting "any exit poll or public opinion

79. See, e.g., Calchera v. Procarione, 805 F. Supp. 716, 720 (E.D. Wis.
1992) (holding that a statute prohibiting electioneering within 500 feet of
polling places was clearly unconstitutional because it encompassed public
sidewalks and streets, as well as private residences).
80. See Arlington County Republican Comm. v. Arlington County, 983
F.2d 587, 595 (4th Cir. 1993) (holding that a county ordinance that broadly
limited the number of temporary signs on private property was an
impermissible content-based restriction and was not narrowly tailored to
further government interests related to public nuisance or safety).
81. The post-vote context encompasses cases in which the government
imposes limitations on non-voting parties' access to voters at polls in an
attempt to preserve electoral integrity.
See supra notes 1-10 and
accompanying text.
82. 838 F.2d 380 (9th Cir. 1988).
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poll with voters" within 300 feet of a polling place.& A local
newspaper, the Daily Herald, the New York Times, ABC, and CBS
alleged that this restriction contravened their First Amendment
right to gather and report election news.
The United States
District Court of Washington declared the statute unconstitutional,
noting that the media's exit polling procedures were systematic,
reliable, and not inherently disruptive.85 Exit polling constituted6
highly protected speech that contributed to political discourse.
The court recognized that "a major purpose of [the First]
Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental
affairs. This of course includes discussions of candidates." ' The
appellate court, signaling its tacit adoption of a negative theory of
expression, further noted the protection of exit polling as a
newsgathering function, stating that "the First Amendment protects
the media's right to gather news."' '
The pivotal finding that the 300-foot vicinity around polling
places constituted a traditional public forum was central to the
ruling in Daily Herald Co. 9 Once polling areas were designated
public fora, any content-based restrictions on speech in those areas
had to withstand strict scrutiny.9
Unless narrowly tailored to
promote a compelling governmental interest, the statute was
presumptively unconstitutional.9
The court acknowledged the

83. Id. at 382 (citing WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 29.51.020(1)(e) (West
1988)).
84. Susan E. Seager & Laura R. Handman, Congress, the Networks, and
Exit Polls, 18 CoMM. LAW., Winter 2001, at 1, 32 [hereinafter Seager &
Handman, Congress, the Networks, and Exit Polls].
85. See id.
86. See Anthony M. Barlow, Restricting Election Day Exit Polling:
Freedom of Expression vs. the Right to Vote, 58 U. CIN. L. REV. 1003, 1016
(1990).
87. Daily Herald Co., 838 F.2d at 384 (quoting Brown v. Hartlage, 456
U.S. 45, 52-53 (1982) (alteration in original)).
88. Id. at 384.
89. Id. at 384-85.
90. Id. at 385. But cf.Morant, Electoral Integrity, supra note 2 (discussing
the confusing state of the public forum doctrine).
91. Daily Herald Co., 838 F.2d at 385.
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significance of the state's interestw in maintaining order and
decorum at the polls and "preserving the integrity of their electoral
processes."9'3 Yet, predictably, this more collective interest in
electoral integrity is significantly outweighed by concerns related to
restrictions on information access, a right related to expressive
autonomy.94 The Washington legislature, in the court's view, failed
to tailor its statute narrowly to advance these interests. 9 Less
restrictive means, i.e., the requirement of separate entrances to
polls or size reduction of the restrictive area, would have
adequately advanced the state's ends. 6 The Washington statute

92. Although the Court did not explicitly find, it impliedly found that the
state's interest was compelling. See generally id. at 382-89.
93. Id. at 385 (quoting Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 52 (1982)).
94. See generally In re Express-News Corp., 695 F.2d 807 (5th Cir. 1982)
(holding that a local rule forbidding jurors to speak to the press after
completion of service except for good cause was unconstitutional as abridging
the press's First Amendment right to gather news); CBS Inc. v. Young, 522
F.2d 234 (6th Cir. 1975) (holding the media group has standing to contest a
participant-directed gag order because gag orders abridge the media's First
Amendment right of access to information); United States v. Harrelson, 713
F.2d 1114, 1116 (5th Cir. 1983). The Harrelsoncourt stated:
The First Amendment right to gather news is neither
absolute nor does it provide journalists with special
privileges denied other citizens ...
accused's right to a fair trial ....

it must yield to an
In this connection,

jurors, even after completing their service, are entitled
to privacy and to protection against harassment.
Id.; see also Marc 0. Litt, "Citizen-Soldiers" or Anonymous Justice:
Reconciling the Sixth Amendment Right of the Accused, The First Amendment
Right of the Media and the Privacy Right of Jurors, 25 COLUM. J.L. & Soc.
PROBS. 371, 421 (1992) ("First Amendment rights to gather news and publish
ought not to be disregarded without searching inquiry and compelling
justifications."); Disa Sim, The Right to Solitude in the United States and
Singapore: A Call for a Fundamental Reordering, 22 LoY. L.A. ENT. L. REV.
443, 452-53 (2002) (arguing that a citizen's right to solitude must be balanced
against the public's right to know and the media's First Amendment right to
gather news).
95. Seager & Handman, Congress, the Networks, and Exit Polls, supra
note 84, at 32.
96. Daily Herald Co., 838 F.2d at 384-85; see also Note, Exit Polls and
FirstAmendment, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1927, 1935 (1985).
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was, therefore, overbroad because its proscriptions interfered with
such non-disruptive activities as exit polling.7
Also noteworthy to the majority in Daily Herald Co., was
the lower court's finding that the legislature's bid for decorum at
the polls constituted a pretext. The true purpose behind the
legislative restriction was to prevent broadcast of early election
returns - an action that allegedly influenced voter turnout. 98 The
court found that this generalized interest failed to justify
restrictions on speech. 9 The Washington statute's broad reach
effectively blocked all the exit poll information including postelection newspaper stories and analyses by academics.'°°
Consequently, the legislature did not employ the least restrictive
means to accomplish its ends. In fact, a pre-existing, less restrictive
law seemingly strengthened the court's rebuke of this legislation.'("
Other cases emulated Daily Herald Co.'s cautionary
analysis of restrictions on access to voters in the post-vote context.
In CBS v. Smith,' 2 a Florida statute that prohibited solicitation of
voters' opinions within 150 feet of a polling place on election day
contravened media's First Amendment right to gather and report
' °3
information about the political process. The overbroad statute W4

97. Daily Herald Co., 838 F.2d at 386; cf. Clean-Up 84 v. Heinrich, 759
F.2d 1511, 1513-14 (11th Cir. 1985) (finding that restrictions against the

procurement of signatures for a petition was overbroad).
98. See generally Daily Herald Co., 838 F.2d 380.
99. Id. at 387.
100. Id. at 387-88. In his concurring opinion, Judge Stephen Reinhardt
emphasized that it was the public dissemination of the exit poll information,
not personal discussions or news-gathering, that was the core First
Amendment activity warranting the utmost protection. Id. at 389 (Reinhardt,

J., concurring). Because a "major purpose of [the First] Amendment [is] to
protect the free discussion of governmental affairs" and ensure an "informed"
public debate on politics. Id. at 390. This purpose "would be meaningless if
the media were not allowed to obtain the information, including information
of the type yielded by exit polls, on which such debate turns." Id. Exit polls
must be protected because they "provide information not only on the outcome

of the election but also on why people vote the way they did." Id.
101. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 29.51.020(1)(d) (West 1993).
102. 681 F. Supp. 794 (S.D. Fla. 1988).

103. Id. at 796.
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was not narrowly tailored to further the state's interest in electoral
integrity and failed strict scrutiny." 5 Of particular note in the Smith
opinion was the specific finding that exit polling was a special form
of protected speech. " 6 In fact, the court observed that the absence
polling would result in the loss of unique and valuable
of exit
data. ' o
In the same year as Daily Herald Co. and CBS Inc. v. Smith,
the court in NBC, Inc. v. Colburg,2' reviewed a Montana statute
that prohibited solicitation of voters' opinions within 200 feet of a
polling place on election day.'09 A focal point of the court's opinion
was media's fundamental right to gather and disseminate
information on how and why individuals voted."0 Not only was the
200-foot boundary an unconstitutional limitation on exit polling,"'
but the statute's alternate and more minimal twenty-five foot zone
also failed strict scrutiny." 2
A federal district court in Georgia similarly rejected a
governmental restriction on the post-vote activity of exit polling.
The case of NBC, Inc. v. Cleland"3 involved a statute that
specifically prohibited exit polling within 250 feet of a polling
place." 4 The government essentially argued that the restriction
served a compelling interest to preserve the sanctity of polling
places and to encourage voter participation. ' The Cleland court
responded in classic, predictable fashion, finding that the contentbased statute was overbroad in its restriction on even non104. Similar to the analysis in McMillan and other pre-vote context cases,
the Smith court based its finding of overbreadth on the statute's broad
restrictions on almost all forms of expression: prohibition of disruptive exitpolling, prohibition of non-disruptive exit-polling, and proscription of speech
in traditional public fora. Id. at 796, 803.

105. Id. at 804.
106. Id. at 803.
107. Id. at 805.
108. 699 F. Supp. 241 (D. Mont. 1988).

109.
110.
111.
112.

Id. at 242.
Id.
Id. at 243.
Id. at 242.

113. 697 F. Supp. 1204 (N.D. Ga. 1988).

114. Id. at 1206.
115. Id. at 1206-07.
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disruptive exit polling.'1 6 The State, therefore, failed to narrowly
tailor the statute, evidenced by the sweeping proscription of all exit
polling, lack of evidence of the impact of exit polling on voter
participation, and duplication in other statutes prohibiting
electioneering adjacent to polls."17 The court noted that electoral
integrity could have been preserved by less restrictive means, such
as the required identification of exit pollsters, notice that voters
may refuse to answer pollsters' questions, or the establishment of
separate entrances or exits for voters.' 8
In dicta, the court in Cleland curiously appeared to endorse
twenty-five feet as the constitutionally permissible boundary
adjacent to the polls."9 The Cleland court resurrected the notion of
distance as a determinant of the constitutionality of polling place
restrictions. In effect, the judge found that, the twenty-five-foot
boundary, instead of the Georgia statute's larger boundary of 250
feet, was a permissible boundary due to its more minimal
restriction. This decision is somewhat at odds with the Supreme
Court's opinion in Burson, which suggested that the relevant
determinant of constitutionality was not the precise measurement
of the boundary, but the boundary's nexus with the prevention of
voter intimidation and fraud.12)
The dicta in Cleland suggests that limitations on post-vote
activities, which have a more attenuated impact on electoral
rule that Burson,
integrity, merit a minimalist, bright-line boundary
121
S
While minimalist
a pre-vote activities case, does not endorse.
restrictions in the post-vote context may have some legitimacy, they
require support in the form of proof that a problem with electoral
integrity actually exists, and that the means to preserve this interest
in voting22 integrity are directly and palpably related to that
interest.1

116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Id. at 1211.
Id. at 1211-12.
Id. at 1212-13.
Id. at 1215.
See Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 206-11 (1992).
See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
See Burson, 504 U.S. 191 at 210.
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Logsdon'23
Journal Broadcasting of Kentucky, Inc. v.
involved a Kentucky statute that prohibited exit polling within 500
feet of the entrance to polling places. Relying substantially on
Daily Herald Co., 124 and echoing the reasoning in Cleland,12 the
tailored
court found that the Kentucky statute was not narrowly
• 126
because it prohibited even non-disruptive exit polling. The court
interestingly observed that polling places constituted traditional
state could not, without considerable proof,
public fora in which the
7
restrict exit polling.1

Judicial rejection of restrictions on access to polls in the
post-vote context continued with predictable regularity, particularly
in cases specifically involving the media. In Beacon Journal
Publishing Co., Inc. v. Blackwell,12 the Secretary of State of Ohio
issued a directive stating that a statute which prohibited loitering
the press.129
adjacent to polling places applied to anyone, including
With support of others in the industry, 13Beacon Journal Publishing
Company, Inc. challenged the government's interpretation of the
anti-loitering statute. 3' In a review of the district court's denial of
Beacon Journal Publishing Company Inc.'s motion for a temporary
123. No. C 8-0147-L(A), 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16864 (W.D. Ky. Oct. 21,
1988).
124. Daily Herald Co. v. Munro, 838 F. 2d 380 (9th Cir. 1988).
125. NBC, Inc. v. Cleland, 697 F. Supp. 1204 (N.D. Ga. 1988); see supra
notes 116-18 and accompanying text.
126. Logsdon, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16864, at *4-*5.
127. Id. Note that the Logsdon court's finding that exit polling takes
place in traditional public fora (polling places) contrasts sharply with Justice
Scalia's finding in Burson. For the Justice Scalia's concurrence, see supra
notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
128. 389 F.3d 683 (6th Cir. 2004).
129. Id. at 684. The statute states that "no person shall loiter or
congregate within the area between the polling place and the small flags of the
United States placed on the thoroughfares and walkways leading to the polling
place...." OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3501.35 (2005).
130. On Election Day November 2, 2004, CBS News allowed me to
observe their coverage of the election returns. The Court of Appeals issued
its decision in Beacon Journal Publishing during my visit at CBS. Although
not noted in the decision, it was clear from my conversation with CBS News
executives that CBS and the other major networks support Beacon Publishing
Company's petition.
131. Beacon JournalPubl'g,389 F.3d at 684.
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restraining order, the Court of Appeals acknowledged the
government's presumptively compelling interest in electoral
integrity. 32 This finding, however, did not absolve the government
of the burden to prove that the blanket denial of media's access to
polls furthered a compelling interest.13 ' Noting the government's
failure to sustain this burden of proof, the court rejected as
speculative the supposition that "turmoil [at the polls] could be
created by hordes of reporters and photographers.', 34

Following

the decisive pattern of previous cases that reviewed restrictions on
access to polling places in the post-vote context, 35 the court vacated
the district court's order and mandated that the government
accommodate the media's non-disruptive access to areas 36adjacent
to polls, "for the purpose of newsgathering and reporting.",1
II. DEMOCRATIC PLURALISM AND THE TENSION BETWEEN
EXPRESSIVE FREEDOM AND ELECTORAL INTEGRITY

The pre-vote and post-vote categories of the cases
presented in Part I of this Article constitute paradigmatic templates
for the discussion of the tension between expressive rights of
individuals who seek access to voting polls and the body politic's
interest in fair elections. Cases within these categories exhibit some
similarities. I For example, , pre-vote138 cases, such as Burson v.
Freeman137 and Schirmer v. Edwards, emphasize that the right to
vote is more vulnerable to intimidation or fraud, a finding that

132. Id. at 685.

133. Id.
134. Id.
135. See supra Part I.B.
136. Beacon Journal Publ'g, 389 F.3d at 685. Judge Cook, the sole
dissenter in Beacon Journal Publishing, acknowledged the merit of the
petitioner's First Amendment claim. However, he could not find that the
district court abused its discretion in its denying injunctive relief. Id. (Cook,
J., dissenting).
137. 504 U.S. 191 (1992).
138. 2 F.3d 117 (5th Cir. 1993).
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justifies measured limitations on access to polling places.139 On the
other hand, cases in the post-vote context, such as Daily Herald Co.
v. Munro'4 0 and Beacon JournalPublishing Co. v. Blackwell, '41 find
that restrictions on access require proof of potential disruption to
the voting process.142
Another interesting distinction in these cases is the
relevance of the restrictive boundary's size in the determination of
In certain pre-vote cases in which the
its constitutionality.
restricted boundary was invalidated despite the possible proclivity
for voter fraud and intimidation, courts note that the boundaries in
question were too large and, therefore, suggest that a small
restricted zone might be constitutionally permissible. 143 By contrast,
many of the post-vote cases that dealt specifically with the issues of
exit polling and the projection of winners flatly reject restrictions,
regardless of size, because of concerns related to free speech and
Most post-vote cases buttress their findings against
press.'restrictions with the observation that the government failed to
provide empirical evidence that links access, particularly by the
media, with disruption of the voting process.141
139. For a detailed discussion of Burson, see supra notes 38-55 and
accompanying text, and for an analysis of Schirmer, see supra notes 56-61 and
accompanying text.
140. 838 F.2d 380 (9th Cir. 1988).
141. 389 F.3d 683 (6th Cir. 2004).
142. For an analysis of Daily Herald Co., see supra notes 82-101, and for
a discussion of Beacon JournalPubl'g, see supra notes 128-36.
143. In pre-vote cases such as Clean-up '84, Firestone, Schirmer, and
Anderson, the courts noted that the restricted boundary imposed by the
government was too large. See Part L.A for detailed analysis of the courts'
discussions regarding these governmental restrictions.
144. In post-vote cases such as Daily Herald Co., Smith, and Colburg, the
courts uniformly found that state restrictions on exit-polling and projections of
elections unconstitutionally limit freedom of the press. See Part I.B for a
detailed discussion of these and other post-vote cases. But see NBC, Inc. v.
Cleland, 697 F. Supp. 1204, 1215 (N.D. Ga. 1988) (appearing to endorse
twenty-five feet as the constitutionally permissible boundary justified by the
state's compelling interest in electoral integrity).
145. See, e.g., Beacon JournalPubl'g, 389 F.3d at 685 (stating that fear of
disruption that could be caused by media's presence at polling places is
"purely hypothetical" and cannot justify a restriction on First Amendment
freedom of the press); Daily Herald Co. v. Munro, 838 F.2d 380, 385 (9th Cir.
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One should not, however, construe these categories as
immutable or mutually exclusive. Cases may have both pre-vote
and post-vote implications. For example, Firestone v. News-Press
Publishing Co.'6 focuses on the constitutionality of a
comprehensive Florida statute prohibiting non-voters from the
actual voting rooms and a fifty-foot area adjacent to polling
147
places.
Firestone presents an analysis that is applicable to prevote activity, such as the solicitation of voters, and post-vote
activity, such as exit polling4
In addition to Firestone,many of the cases discussed in Part
I of this Article share decisional commonalities, exposing the rather
tenuous nature of these categories. In fact, the distinctions between
access to polls before (pre-vote) and after (post-vote) individuals
cast their ballots appear less germane than the fundamental
question of whether the exercise of First Amendment access to
polling places at any time has a deleterious impact on the electoral
process. The opinions of many cases discussed in this essay
underscore the rather fluid nature of pre-vote/post-vote distinction.
The rule that the government must prove that restrictions are
necessary to further the government's interests in electoral integrity
appears universally applicable to any restriction on access to polls,
regardless if that access occurs before or after individuals have
voted. 141
1988) (stating that "there was no evidence that someone did not vote or voted

differently because of the exit polls"); CBS Inc. v. Smith, 681 F. Supp. 794, 804
(S.D. Fla. 1988) (opining that "there is no . . . evidence to support the
contention that exit polls or reporters' interviews with willing voters have ever
disrupted any polling place in the state"); Cleland, 697 F. Supp. at 1211-12
(observing that "[t]he State produced no first-hand evidence that any voter
had ever decided not to vote because of the existence of exit polls, or that such
a result was in any way a real danger").
146. 538 So. 2d 457 (Fla. 1989).
147. Id. at 459-60.
148. For a detailed discussion of Firestone, see supra notes 34-37 and
accompanying text.
149. See, e.g., Beacon Journal Publ'g, 389 F.3d at 685 (stating that the
Ohio statute's broad restrictions on access to polling places requires proof that
the restrictions are "necessary to serve the state's compelling interest [in
orderly elections]" and "narrowly drawn to achieve that end"); Burson v.
Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 198 (1992) (quoting Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local
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More relevant than the pre-vote/post-vote distinction of

these cases is their collective attempt to balance personal
autonomy, which access to polling places implicates, and the body

politic's interest in fair elections. This attempted balance of the
personal right of autonomy with the society's right to fair elections
underscores the somewhat kinetic nature of constitutional rights.
The apparent dominance of autonomy in the judiciary's
balance of personal and collective rights seems fundamentally
related to the express provision of free speech in the Constitution.5 '
Expressive freedom fosters all forms of personal autonomy52 and
A truly
applies to all persons, both natural and corporate.
democratic society must foster an individual's expressive liberties,
which, inter alia, include freedoms of speech and press. 1 4 As the
Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)) (suggesting that tailored restrictive
boundaries, adjacent to pools and implemented to minimize intimidation and
fraud, can be constitutional so long as they do not "significantly impinge" on
First Amendment rights).
150. The use of the term "kinetic" here in this Article connotes the
constant motion or flux of competing interests within a democratic society.
See generally Laura S. Fitzgerald, Cadenced Power: The Kinetic Constitution,
46 DUKE L.J. 679, 724 (1997) (stating that constitutional power is a dynamic
"among the People" and, therefore, is kinetic and not static).
151. The First and Sixth Amendments restrict governmental action
See generally LAURENCE H. TRIBE, 1 AMERICAN
against individuals.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

8 n.8 (3d ed. 2000); Morant, Electoral Integrity, supra

note 2, at 26-27 (describing expressive liberties in the United States as
inelastic).
152. See C. Edwin Baker, Media That Citizens Need, 147 U. PA. L. REV.
317, 320 (1998) (stating that "liberal pluralism" recognizes "intractable
diversity" with conflicting values, ideas and interests as normative).
153. See supra note 11. See generally Randall Bezanson, Institutional
Speech, 80 IOWA L. REV. 735, 739 (1995) (noting expressive liberty as an
originally conceived right of human-kind, with institutional speech as an
abstraction from that of the individual); Steven R. Ratner, Corporationsand
Human Rights: A Theory of Legal Responsibility, 111 YALE L.J. 443, 514
(2001).
154. See David A. Anderson, Freedom of the Press, 80 TEx. L. REV. 429,
444 (2002) (expressing that media of any form, i.e., information,
entertainment, or news, enjoys the right to expressive freedom, with the
perennial question being whether rights of broadcast and other media forms
are as extensive as those enjoyed by the press or print media); see also PETE E.
KANE, MURDER, COURTS, AND THE PRESS: ISSUES IN FREE PRESS / FAIR
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cases in Part I of this Article illustrate, the media is entitled to the
right of free expression, particularly if the expression relates to the
industry's dissemination of information regarding elections. M
Personal autonomy and its preservation, however, do not
completely define a democratic society. "Society" constitutes a6
1
body of individuals who must cooperate to further personal goals. 1
. 157
..

This composite of individuals constitutes the body politic, which
8
exerts authority through an elected executive1
• 159 and a legislature
composed of popularly elected representatives.

TRIAL 68 (1986) (noting that a recent history of criminal trials has shown that
judges are more aware of express and implicit rights under the First and Sixth
Amendments).
155. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. U.S., 403 U.S. 713, 717 (1971)
(stating that the press must be free to publish without censorship); Daily
Herald Co. v. Munro, 838 F.2d 380, 384 (9th Cir. 1988) (deciding that "the

information disseminated based on [exit polling and] .

.

. the process of [exit

polling]" constitute protected speech); CBS Inc. v. Smith, 681 F. Supp. 794,
796 (S.D. Fla. 1988) (opining that gathering and reporting information
regarding elections are two basic rights protected by the First Amendment);
NBC, Inc. v. Colburg, 699 F. Supp. 241, 242 (D. Mont. 1988) (finding that
gathering and disseminating exit poll results constitute speech that is protected
by the First Amendment).
In other contexts, however, media may experience limitations on
expressive rights. As a result, access to criminal trials often depends on the
form of media seeking access (broadcast versus print) and the impact on a
defendant's right to a fair trial. See Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 539-40 (1965)
(noting that different media forms require different scrutiny as decisionmakers balance media access rights with a defendant's right to due process).
156. See Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Labor and the CorporateStructure
Changing Conceptions and Emerging Possibilities,55 U. CHI. L. REv. 73, 167
(1988) (citing ANTHONY GIDDENS, STUDIES IN SOCIAL AND POLITICAL
THEORY 348 (1977)) (noting a society is "a system of power founded in
entrenched divergencies of interest").
157. For a more complete definition of "body politic," see Morant,
Electoral Integrity, supra note 2, at 4-5.
158. See Morant, Electoral Integrity,supra note 2, at 21-23.
159. Article I of the Constitution states that "[aill legislative powers...
shall be vested in a Congress of the United States .... " U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
See generally City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 313 (1981)
(emphasizing that federal law "is generally made ... by the people through
their elected representatives in Congress"); Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 694
(1892) (stressing that Congress, as a body composed of elected
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Valid
elections contribute
to representation
that
theoretically advances the interests of members of a collective
society. Periodic elections check representative power, which is
exercised in a manner that preserves societal well-being ' 6° and
concomitantly respects personal liberties. An electoral process that
is untainted161 by fraud or voter intimidation ensures responsive
governance.
Electoral integrity, therefore, becomes critical to a
legitimate democracy. 62 A common theme that runs through many
of the cases presented in Part I of this Article is the importance of
elections in a functional democracy - a truism that undergirds the
government's compelling interest to preserve electoral integrity. ' 63

representatives, has the power to make laws that are applicable to the general
populace).
160. "Societal well-being" correlates to Professor Baker's concept of the
common good, a dominant feature of the republican theory of democracy and
an element of Baker's preferred complex democracy theory. See Baker, supra
note 152, at 331-36.
161. See id.; see also Nancy L. Rosenblum, Primus Inter Pares: Political
Parties and Civil Society, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 493, 509 (2000) (espousing

that democratic norms include such factors as maximization of political
participation, preservation of electoral integrity, prevention of fraud and
corruption, and fostering an informed electorate).
162. See id.
163. See, e.g., Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 209 (1992) (recognizing
that the government has a compelling interest in proactively, rather than
retroactively, securing the right to vote); Beacon Journal Publ'g Co. v.
Blackwell, 389 F.3d 683 (6th Cir. 2004) (noting the state's interest in enabling
citizens to vote freely without intimidation); United Food & Commercial
Workers Local 1099 v. City of Sidney, 364 F.3d 738, 747-48 (6th Cir. 2004)
(noting the state's valid interest in preserving order at polling places); Marlin
v. D.C. Board of Elections and Ethics, 236 F.3d 716, 720 (D.C. Cir. 2001)
(noting the state's interest in maintaining order in the election process);
Schirmer v. Edwards, 2 F.3d 117, 121 (5th Cir. 1993) (noting the state's
compelling interest in the preservation of the right to vote); Calchera v.
Procarione, 805 F. Supp. 716, 720 (E.D. Wis. 1992) (noting the state's
compelling interest in maintaining the integrity of the electoral process and
ensuring that voters are free from intimidation and harassment); NBC, Inc. v.
Cleland, 697 F. Supp. 1204, 1211 (N.D. Ga. 1988) (opining that the state has a
compelling interest in maintaining the sanctity of polling places and
encouraging voter participation).
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An individual's right to vote, however, constitutes an
expressive mechanism' 64 with normative implications. Individuals in
a democratic society express governing preferences through votes
that are informed and cast freely without undue influence. The
need for such integrity in voting underscores the seminal function
of media, which can inform the electorate and ensure the soundness
of the voting process. As the court in CBS v. Smith 65 observes,
data, particularly that related to exit polling, serves to explain
"issues of public importance" and become the functional tools of
scholars who explain voting behavior. '66
The right to vote also becomes a governmental priority,
particularly if one views the government in a pluralist democracy as
a facilitator of personal autonomy.167 Accordingly, the government
must not
168 only foster unintimidated participation in the voting

process, but it must also ensure that its efforts to preserve voter
integrity do not impinge upon the informational flow required to
educate voters and monitor the voting process. Information
gathered and exchanged near voting polls facilitates expression that
can reveal the functionality of the voting process, and this explains
the judicial aversion to restrictions on access to areas adjacent to

164. For further analysis about the importance of campaigns and
elections in the maintenance and fostering of free speech and political
participation, see generally Daniel Ortiz, From Rights to Arrangements, 32
Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1217 (1999).
165. CBS Inc. v. Smith, 681 F. Supp. 794 (S.D. Fla. 1988).
166. Id. at 805. Other cases discussed in Part I underscore the societal
function of media as the facilitator of voting integrity and democracy. See,
e.g., Daily Herald Co. v. Munro, 838 F.2d 380, 388 (9th Cir. 1988) (noting that
exit poll results are valuable to analysts and scholars who study the electoral
process); NBC, Inc. v. Cleland, 697 F. Supp. 1204, 1211 (N.D. Ga. 1988)
(stating that information from exit poles can reveal social and political trends
and voting tendencies). But see Morant, Electoral Integrity, supra note 2, at
10-11 (discussing the alleged impact of the media's erroneous projections on
voter conduct during the 2000 presidential election).
167. See infra notes 168-70 (arguing the importance of both expressive
autonomy and the right to vote as constructs of democratic pluralism).
16& See supra notes 42, 58, 132 and accompanying text (noting the
government's compelling interest in electoral integrity).
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polls." 9 In particular, media's access to polls becomes critically
important as the conduit for information that checks governmental
functionality, regardless of speculative assumptions associated with
the industry's negative impact on the voting process.17
Personal and governmental interests in voting integrity are
symbiotic. In fact, the government's influence, authority, and
ultimate credibility hinge on the collective will of an informed
electorate. Personal liberties and the government's legitimacy are,
therefore, inexorably connected, with neither flourishing without
the other.' 7' The collective nature of these interests tacitly explains,
169. Many of the cases detailed in Part I recognize the government's
interest in electoral integrity but reject restrictions on access to areas near
polling places as an impermissible abridgement of speech and access. See, e.g.,
Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 210-11 (1992) (finding that governmental
restrictions on voter solicitation could become impermissibly burdensome at
"some measurable distance from the polls," but Tennessee's 100-foot
boundary was "on the constitutional side of the line"); Calchera v. Procarione,
805 F. Supp. 716, 720 (E.D. Wis. 1992) (recognizing that the government's
compelling interest in electoral integrity did not justify the state's restricted
zone of 750,000 square feet); Committee for Sandy Springs, Georgia, Inc. v.
Cleland, 708 F. Supp. 1289, 1291 (N.D. Ga. 1988) (finding that a restricted 250foot zone around voting polls to be overbroad, but noting that a smaller zone
may be constitutional); Florida Committee for Liability Reform v. McMillan,
682 F. Supp. 1536, 1541 (M.D. Fla. 1988) (stating that voters need protection
only within the polling place).
170. Cases in Part I underscore the media's seminal function in checking
government and the particular need for the industry's access to polls. See, e.g.,
Beacon Journal Publ'g Co. v. Blackwell, 389 F.3d 683, 685 (6th Cir. 2004)
(observing that the government's interest in electoral integrity cannot justify
restrictions on freedom of the press without evidence that media's access
interferes with an individual's right to vote); NBC, Inc. v. Colburg, 699 F.
Supp. 241, 242 (D. Mont. 1988) (opining that the gathering and dissemination
of news regarding voting behavior is protected speech that cannot be unduly
restricted by the government); NBC, Inc. v. Cleland, 697 F. Supp. 1204, 121112 (N.D. Ga. 1988) (finding that, despite the state's interest in electoral
integrity, governmental restrictions enacted to ensure that voters are not
"bothered" by pollsters are unconstitutional).
171. See THOMAS I. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE
FIRST AMENDMENT 4-7, 8-11, 14-15 (1966) (noting that personal autonomy
and meaningful participation in democratic processes are core speech values);
FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREEDOM OF SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 3546, 60-72, 85-86 (1982) (finding the codependency of individuality/autonomy
and democracy, the latter pertaining to interests critical to preservation of the
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if not justifies, the jurisprudential dominance of expressive freedom
in these cases.172
The interdependence of a citizen's right to vote and the
government's interest in electoral integrity constitutes the essence
of democratic pluralism, which recognizes the symbiosis of personal
and collective rights and fosters a mutuality of respect for these
competing interests. Democracy's legitimacy depends on its
furtherance
of a reciprocal respect for the expressive autonomy of
173
others.

In my view, the jurisprudence of access to polling places
tacitly fosters democratic pluralism through the attempted balance
of individualized and collective interests. A democracy that
preserves both personal expressive rights and fair and fully
participatory elections requires decision-makers to further the
interests of the body politic in electoral integrity, while
simultaneously promoting respect for personal expressive rights.
This more pluralistic form of democracy recognizes that the
prosperity of the individual and the body politic depends upon the
recognition of their independence when resolving their apparent
conflict in cases such as those discussed in Part I of this article.

body politic). See generally Steven Shiffrin, The First Amendment and
Economic Regulation: Away From a General Theory of the First Amendment,

78 Nw. U. L. REV. 1212 (1983) (advancing a more pluralistic approach that
recognizes both personal autonomy and preservation of democratic processes
as mutually essential components).
172. Note that the majority of cases in Part I found governmental
restrictions on access to areas adjacent to polling places unconstitutional. In
fact, 63% of the pre-vote cases and 100% of the post-vote cases rejected
governmental restrictions on access to polling places. See supra Part I.
173. Others seem to endorse Baker's dignitary view of autonomy. See
DAVID A. B. RICHARDS, TOLERATION AND THE CONSTITUTION 97-98, 165-78
(1986) (recognizing the "right to conscience" as a foundational element of the
First Amendment, and generally noting the need for mutual respect for
various voices in a society); JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM xxiv-xxvii
(1993).

See generally

BRUCE ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL

(1980); Morant, The Endemic Reality of Media Ethics and SelfRestraint, supra note 2, at 602-05 (detailing the mutual-respect notion of
democracy); Morant, Contemporary Media, supra note 5, at 959, 962
(discussing a respect-based model of autonomy).
STATE
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CONCLUSION

The following quotation from Democratic Party v.
Lungren174 illustrates the judiciary's deep respect for the personal
right to free expression:
Properly viewed, the first amendment protects
free expression as an end in itself. But even
under a narrower . . . view of the first
amendment, there is an irreducible core
requirement. It is that political speech must be
free so that the sovereign people can decide
public issues. To posit that the people may
decide incorrectly, and therefore should be
denied information in order to steer their
decisions, is to posit some other sovereign who
can decide when the people are likely to be
mistaken, and what they should be allowed to
Little would be left of the first
know.
amendment under such a regime. '75
1 76
As the following quotation from Wesberry v. Sanders
indicates, the judiciary also recognizes the sanctity of the right to
vote such that "[n]o right is more precious in a free country than
that of having a voice in the election of those who make the laws
under which, as good citizens, we must live. Other rights, 77even the
most basic, are illusory if the right to vote is undermined."1
These seemingly antithetical quotations expose the
continual tension between freedom of speech and the more
collective interests in free and fair elections. It is doubtful that a
predictable formula for the achievement of a balance between these
interests truly exists. Beyond the elusive search for that formula,
however, lies a dynamic that defines an active, democratic society.
The quotations from California Democratic Party and Wesberry,
together with the cases previously discussed in this Article,

174. 919 F. Supp. 1397 (N.D. Cal. 1996).

175. Id. at 1402.
176. 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
177. Id. at 17.
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illustrate this dynamic. The judiciary's attempts to resolve the
apparent conflict between free speech and the preservation of
electoral integrity represents the very essence of democratic
pluralism - that expressive autonomy must be evaluated in light of
the collective interest in fair and honest elections.
This
interdependence of personal and collective interests remains an
inescapable norm of a free society, and contributes to the breadth
and vitality of a truly pluralistic democracy.

